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I
Occasionally, in a foreword to a symposium published in this quarterly, it has
seemed appropriate to explain the significance of the problem posed for consideration
and to develop the reasons leading to. its selection. But for a symposium appearing
at this time on the subject of collective bargaining under the Wagner Act, such an
explanation would be supererogatory. The only function which a foreword to this
symposium can usefully fulfill is to indicate, in broad outline, the scope of the issue.
Although, for a thorough comprehension of the purposes of the National Labor
Relations Act-popularly known by the name of its Senatorial sponsor, Senator
Robert A. Wagner of New York State-a familiarity iWith those activities of the
federal government directed toward the establishment of harmonious relations between employer and employee antedating the passage of this act would be essential,
an adequate presentation of their history and of the legal problems that they raised
would have encroached seriously on the space available to the immediate subject
matter of the symposium. Moreover, a number of works have been published in
which this background is depicted in detail. Accordingly, its consideration has been
relegated to a brief section of the introductory note appended to this foreword. That
note also sets forth, in summary outline, the provisions of the Act, the administrative
machinery established under it, and the work accomplished by the Board in its first
twenty-eight months of existence, and concludeg with a brief discussion of the constitutional issues raised by the Act, which have been considered in decisions of the
United States Supreme Court.
The three articles following this note deal with three principal types of problems
encountered by the Board in its administration of the Act. The first of these discusses
in detail the procedure and principles followed by the Board in determining employee representatives for collective bargaining purposes, a jurisdiction which involves
the determination of the preliminary problem of the "appropriate unit" of representation. It is this question which has placed the Board in the storm center of the struggle between the American Federation of Labor and the Committee for Industrial
Organization. The second of this group of articles surveys the questions raised in the
enforcement of the Act's prohibition against "unfair labor practices" interfering with
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the free exercise of the employees' right of self-organization. The third article considers the duty imposed by the Act on the employer to bargain collectively with the
employee representatives.
The adoption of the Wagner Act has led, as is well known, not only to a marked
extension in unionization but also to the execution of a large number of collective
labor agreements. A group of four articles deals with some of the principal problems
arising out of these developments. Any agreement establishing rules to govern so
complex a relationship as that of employer and employee in modern industrial life
is almost surely destined to give rise to dispute as to its meaning and application.
Accordingly, it becomes important to determine what machinery is provided in the
agreement itself for the adjustment of such disputes. While provision for such
machinery has long characterized agreements of this sort, the recent vast extension
in their number has made it of interest to ascertain how this problem is being handled
under the new agreements. Such is the purpose of the first article in this group.
However adequate the machinery provided for dispute adjustment, it may be anticipated that occasions will occur when either it fails to function or its judgments are
ignored. The second of these articles briefly surveys- the somewhat limited body of
law developed by the courts which have been called upon to give judicial enforcement
to cbllective agreements and then proceeds to consider the possibility of establishing
extra-judicial agencies to enforce them, concluding with the proposal of a plan to this
end. The third article of this group depicts the procedure through which union
determinations of policy and action are arrived at, a little-known subject of obvious
importance to an understanding of the operation of the collective bargaining process.
The fourth article deals succinctly with the adjustments in personnel policies which
the Wagner Act and the developments following upon it are requiring of employers.
Opposition to the Act has, in recent months, taken form in a growing demand
for its amendment, principally directed toward placing duties on employees and their
organizations." So various have been the proposals of amendment that the consideration of all has seemed impracticable. Instead, an article is presented stating the case
for a representative group of such proposed amendments. This is succeeded by a note
containing an excerpt from an address by Chairman Madden of the National Labor
Relations Board in which he states what is believed to be the basic objection to most
proposals for amendment on the part of those who object to the imposition of duties
on labor under the Act.
So frequently has British procedure in the handling of industrial disputes been
referred to as a model worthy of emulation in this country that the concluding article
of the symposium is devoted to a portrayal of the evolution of British policy and
practice in this field during the past century.
' An important exception is a bill recently introduced by Senator Wagner wliich, if enacted, would
strongly reinforce the sanctions of the Act. The bill (S. 3390) provides that government contractors and
sub-contractors (including fecipients of loans and grants from the federal government) shall agree to comply with all rulings and certifications of the NLRB. A like bill (H. R. 9745) has been introduced in the
House by Representative Healey.
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II
The National Labor Relations Act of July 5, 1935, derives principally from three
sources in the experience of the federal government as intervenor in industrial disputes, although, it need scarcely be added, these do not constitute its only ventures in
this field.2 The first of the three was the work of the National War Labor Board,
active from April 1918 until August 1919. This board had for its chief purpose the
settlement "by mediation or conciliation" of labor controversies in necessary war
industries. The contribution of this board most significant in this context was its
adoption of the policy of forbidding employer interference with the right of employees to organize and bargain collectively and employer discrimination against
employees engaging in lawful union activities.
The second important source in experience basic to the Wagner Act was that
derived under the Railway Labor Act of 1926 and the amendments thereto adopted
in 1934. The 1926 Act, in turn the outgrowth of earlier legislation that had not
functioned satisfactorily, provided an elaborate machinery of boards for mediation,
arbitration, and fact-finding in disputes between railroads and their employees. This
act gave federal legislative sanction to the right of employees to bargain collectively
free from interference, influence, or coercion. Inquiry in 1933 by the Federal Coordinator of Transportation revealed that, despite this legislation, company unions
had been fostered on a large scale by the railroads. Under the Emergency Transportation Act of 1933 and under the 1934 amendments to the Railway Labor Act designed to implement collective bargaining and to suppress the company union, the
movement for self-organization among railroad employees was given great impetus.
Of special pertinence to the Wagner Act was the development of a system of elections for the purpose of determining employee representatives under the supervision
of the National Mediation Board (the analogue in the railroad field to the present
National Labor Relations Board).
The third and most important precursor of the present law is, of course, the
famous Section 7(a) of the National Industrial Recovery Act. That section required
that codes of fair competition, established under the NIRA, should contain the
following conditions:
"(i) That employees shall have the rightto organize and bargain collectively through
representatives of their own choosing, and shall be free from the interference, restraint, or
coercion of employers of labor, or their agents, in the designation of such representatives
or in self-organization or in other concerted activities for the purpose of collective bargaining or other mutual aid or protection;
"(2) That no employee and no one seeking employment shall be required as a condition of employment to join any company union or to refrain from joining, organizing, or
assisting a labor organization of his own choosing; ... "
'For a succinct statement of the legislative background bf the Wagner Act, see NLRB, FRST ANNUAL
(1936) 1-8. See also TWENTIETH CENTURY FUND, INc., LABOR AND THE GOVERNMENT (935);
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No attempt at complete documentation will be made in this note.
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As will be recalled, in the summer of 1933 the process of codification was anticipated by the President's Re-employment Agreement which included the conditions
quoted above. The need for some agency to handle labor controversies under this
agreement and under the codes led to the creation by President Roosevelt on August
5, 1933, of the National Labor Board, comprising representatives of labor and industry, with Senator Wagner acting as impartial chairman. Although special boards
for certain industries were created either under their codes or by executive order, the
National Labor Board took jurisdiction of alleged violations of Section 7(a) in all
other industries. Operating through 20 regional boards, comparable in structure to
the National Board, it was successful in settling or averting over x6oo strikes,
although handicapped by the informal character of its authority, inadequately defined relationships with the NRA and with the special boards, the lack of any direct
sanction for its recommendations, and the notorious ambiguities of Section 7(a).
The Board .frequently utilized the device of elections to determine employee representatives and, through its decisions involving this and other problems incident to
the establishment of free collective bargaining, broke ground for the boards succeeding it.

The successor to the National Labor Board was the first National Labor Relations Board, established by the President under authority of Public Resolution
No. 44, approved on June

19,

1934. This resolution was adopted to give legislative

basis to the activities which the National Labor Board had been pursuing under
executive order. The new Board's jurisdiction was based on Section 7(a) of the
National Industrial Recovery Act and hence when that statute was extinguished by
the Supreme Court in' May, 1935, the Board's activities were terminated. In the
meantime, however, it had carried forward the work of its predecessor, although subject to many of the same handicaps. This board developed still further the employee
election device, conducting elections in 579 employee units in its eleven months of
activity.

At the time of the adoption of the joint resolution authorizing this board, there
had been pending in Congress a bill introduced by Senator Wagner, substantially
along the lines of the present Wagner Act. This bill was reintroduced by him in the
Senate on February 21, 1935, and in the House by Representative Connery on Febru8
ary 28. After a legislative consideration indicated in the footnote below, the bill
was approved by both houses on June 27, 1935 and signed by the President on July 5.
aHearings were held before the Senate Committee on Education and Labor on March 11-14, March
i5-19, and March 21-April 2; and before the House Committee on Labor on March 13, 14, 19, 20, 28,
and April 3-4. On May 2, 1935, the bill was reported by the Senate Committee, with minor amendments.
SEN. RaP. No. 573, 74 th Cong., ist Ses. After debate, it was passed by the Senate on May 16, 1935,
without amendment, by a vote of 63 to 12. 79 CoNG. REc. 7846-7855, 7858, 7877, 7848-7960, 7967798o (1935). The bill was reported by the House Committee on Labor on May 21, 1935. H. R. REP. No.
972. It was thereafter recommitted, and subsequently reported with further amendments on June xo,
1935. H. R. REP. No. 1147. The bill was extensively debated on the House floor and passed with
amendments on June 19, 1935, without a record vote. 79 CONG. REc. 10057-10092, 10094-10II. After
conference, the bill was approved by both houses on June 27, 1935, 79 CoNG. Rac. io668, 10704-10705;
CoNE. RaP. No. 1371. (Information taken from NLRB, FIRs' ANNUAL REPoRT (936) 9.)
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III
The structure of the National Labor Relations Act, unlike that of most of the
important enactments of the New Deal, is relatively simple. The substantive objective
of its draftsmen was to provide a direct legislative prohibition of the practices which
had been attacked, through the medium of codes of fair competition, by Section 7(a)
of the NIRA. The proceedure adopted to sanction this prohibition was the same as
that provided in the Federal Trade Commission Act and a number of subsequent
regulatory statutes: the creation of a quasi-judicial body, empowered to investigate
charges, to institute proceedings against offenders, to hold hearings therein, and to
issue orders enforceable only by application to the courts.
The Act contains sixteen sections. Section i is a preamble, declaring the experiential basis and the policy of the Act; Section 2 contains definitions; Sections 3, 4,
and 5 provide for the creation of the National Labor Relations Board, its peIrsonnel,
and its administrative machinery; and Section 6 gives the Board rule-making power.
Section 7 declares the right of employees to self.:organization and collective bargaining; and Section 8 defines as "unfair labor practices" certain acts by employers calculated to impair the rights granted to employees by Section 7. Section 9 deals with
the determination of employee representatives for collective bargaining purposes.
Section io prescribes the procedure to be followed by the Board when violations of
Section 8 are charged and provides for judicial enforcement and review of the
Board's orders. Section ii confers investigatory powers on the Board. Section 12
subjects to'fine or imprisonment persons impeding the Board in the exercise of its
functions. Section 13 declares that nothing in the Act shall be construed to interfere
with the right to strike. Sections 14, 15, and 16 contain customary formal clauses
providing for conflicting legislation, separability of unconstitutional provisions, and
the title of the Act. In the succeeding paragraphs a brief commentary will be made
on the principal sections listed above.
Section r. The first three paragraphs of this sectibn recite the experience leading
to the enactment of the statute. The denial by employers of the right of employees
to organize and the refusal to bargain collectively with them is said to lead to strikes
and other fbrms of industrial discord which burden or obstruct commerce by impairing the functioning of its instrumentalities, by affecting the flow or prices of raw
materials or processed goods in commerce, or by diminishing purchasing power for
goods flowing in commerce. The inequality in bargaining power between the unorganized employee and the corporate employer is said to burden and affect the flow
of commerce and to accentuate business depressions. The protection by law of the
right to organize and bargain collectively is stated to have been proved by experience
to remove sources of industrial strife, encourage the friendly settlement of disputes,
and restore equality of bargaining power. Following these recitals, the policy of the
United States is declared to be the elimination or mitigation of obstructions to the
free flow of commerce by encouraging collective bargaining and assuring to workers
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"full freedom of association, self-organization, and designation of representatives of
their own choosing" for collective bargaining purposes.
Section 2. Of the eleven terms4 defined for the purposes of the Act in this section,
only those which in substance define the scope of the Act will be noted here. The

definition of "employer" excludes the United States, states and their political subdivisions, employers subject to the Railway Labor Act, and labor organizations
(except as to their own employees). "Employee" is defined to include persons whose
work has ceased because of a labor dispute or unfair labor practice and to exclude
agricultural laborers, domestic servants, and persons employed by their parents or
spouses. "Commerce" is defined to mean interstate or foreign "trade, traffic, com-

merce, transportation or communication"; "affecting commerce," to mean "in commerce, or burdening or obstructing commerce or the free flow of commerce or having
led or tending to lead to a labor dispute" having such result.
Section 3. The National Labor Relations Board created by this section is composed of three members, appointed by the President for terms of five years (two of
the original appointees having terms of one and three years, respectively). The chairman is designated by the President. Board members may be removed by the President, upon notice and hearing, for "neglect of duty or malfeasance in office" only.
Sections 7 and 8. These sections together corriprise the substantive core of the
Act, all other provisions being designed to implement them. Section 7, as has been
seen, declares the right of employees to self-organization and to bargain collectively
through representatives of their own choosing, language which echoes that of Section
7(a) of the NIRA. But whereas Section 7(a) declared the right of employees in
general terms, Section 8, in its definition of unfair labor practices, gives specification
to the duties of employers. Five unfair practices are set forth, the first being a
catch-all forbidding employers- "to interfere with, restrain or coerce employees in the
exercise of the rights guaranteed in Section 7-" The second forbids domination or
interference with the formation or administration of any labor organization or the
contribution of support to it. The third forbids discrimination as to terms, tenure or
conditions of employment '"to encourage or discourage membership in any labor
organization." Since this provision would preclude closed shop agreements, a proviso
excepts from its operation such agreements when not made with an employer-

dominated labor organization. The fourth practice proscribed by the Act is the discharge of, or discrimination against, an employee for having filed charges or testified
under the Act. The fifth practice, refusal to bargain collectively with the employee
representatives, unlike the preceding provisions, places an affirmative duty on the
employer. It should be noted that the duty is to bargain, not to agree. The uncertainties encountered in the administration of Section 7(a) of the NIRA with respect
to the identification of the employee representative having pointed the need for
'The terms defined in the Act but not discussed in the text are: "person," "representatives," "labor
organization," "unfair labor practice," "labor dispute," "National Labor Relations Board," "old Board."
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machinery for this purpose, provision is made for such in Section 9, to which Section
8(5) is made expressly subject.
Section 9.Paragraph (a) of this section adopts the principle of "majority rule"
by providing that the representatives chosen for collective bargaining purposes by the
majority of the employees "in a unit appropriate for such purpose, shall be the
exclusive representatives of all the employees in such unit" '5 Paragraph (b) imposes
on the Board the duty of determining whether the appropriate unit shall be "the
employer unit, craft unit, plant unit, or sub-divisions thereof." Paragraph (c) authorizes the Board to investigate any controversy "affecting commerce" concerning
representation and to certify the representatives designated or selected. In so doing,
it is empowered to "take a secret ballot of employees, or utilize any other suitable
method."
Section ro. This section sets forth the procedure to be followed by the Board in
the prevention of unfair labor practices "affecting commerce." Paragraph (a) declares the Board's power to be exclusive. Paragraph (b) authorizes the Board to
institute proceedings by complaint against any person charged with having engaged
in unfair labor practices. Provision is made for the holding of a hearing before the
Board or a designated agent on the charges. In such proceedings "the rules of
evidence prevailing in courts of law or equity shall not be controlling." Paragraph
(c) provides that if the Board is of the opinion that the person complained of is
guilty of an unfair labor practice it "shall state its findings of fact and shall issue...
an order requiring such person to cease and desist from such unfair labor practice,
and to take such affirmative action, including reinstatement of employees, with or
without back pay, as will effectuate the policies" of the Act.
Violation of the Board's order itself carries no penalty, but paragraph (e) empowers the Board to petition any United States Circuit Court of Appeals having
jurisdiction for the enforcement of its order. The court's action shall be based on
the record of the proceeding before the Board, and the "findings of the Board as to
the facts, if supported by evidence, shall be conclusive." However, leave may be obtained to introduce additional evidence where reasonable grounds for failure to introduce it in the hearing before the Board can be shown.
Paragraph (f) authorizes "any person aggrieved by a final order of the Board
grahting or denying in whole or in part the relief sought" to obtain a review in the
Circuit Court of Appeals having jurisdiction. Paragraph (i) provides that petitions
filed under the Act shall be heard "expeditiously," if possible within ten days.
Section ii. This section implements the Board's investigatory powers by granting
it power to issue subpoenas to witnesses and for the production of evidence and also
provides for the administration of oaths. The Board may resort to the federal district
courts for orders requiring obedience to its subpoenas.
A proviso declares, "That any individual employee or group of employees shall have the right at any
time to present grievances to their employer."
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IV

The principal office of the National Labor Relations Board is fixed in Washington by Section 5 of the Act, but the Board has taken advantage of authority conferred
upon it by Section 4(a) to continue a system of regional offices which had been in
existence under the old Board. There are now twenty-two such offices, each headed
by a full-time "regional director." The regional director, under the supervision of
the Washington office, is in charge of "labor relations work, investigating charges of
commission of unfair labor practices and petitions for certification of representatives,
attempting to secure compliance with the law without formal procedure, issuing
complaints, or refusing to issue complaints, upon the recommendation of the regional
attorney, setting dates for hearing and arranging for the holding of hearings, and
holding elections as agent of the Board.""
Upon the filing of a charge with the regional director that an employer has engaged in an unfair labor practice, he undertakes a thorough preliminary investigation
of the charge (which is not made public at this stage of the proceedings). If the
charge seems to him unfounded he will refuse to issue a complaint (an action subject
to Board review). Where the charge seems sustained by evidence, the director attempts to secure voluntary compliance by the employer. Where this fails, he issues
a formal complaint, giving notice of hearing before one of the trial examiners. The
respondent may file an answer to the complaint and any interested person or labor
organization may intervene. The hearings are public, witnesses being examined

under oath. The Board is represented by counsel, usually the regional attorney, upon
whom rests the responsibility of proving the allegations of the complaint. The trial
examiner may examine any witness and call witnesses himself. Although, as has
been seen, the Board is not bound by legal rules of evidence, the Board has declared
T
that its policy is not to disregard these rules wholly but to apply them liberally.
Oral arguments and written briefs are permitted.
Following the hearing, the trial examiner is required to file an "intermediate report" which is served on the parties. This report contains the examiner's findings of
fact and his recommendations as to the disposition of the case. Any party may file
exceptions to the report with the Board. After the report is filed and the time (ten
days) for filing exceptions has expired, the Board will either decide the matter on
the record (or after the filing of briefs or oral argument) or may order the taking
of further evidence. The Board occasionally permits, in important cases, the filing of
charges directly with it and sometimes transfers a proceeding for hearing before the
Board itself.
Proceedings for the determination of representatives for collective bargaining purposes under Section 9 are instituted by the filing of *a petition with the regional
director for investigation of a controversy concerning representation. The regional
'NLRB, Fsasr ANNUAL REPORT (1936) 16. My description of the Board's organization and procedure
represents a condensation of a fuller statement appearing in this Report at pp. 14-28.
' Id. at 23.
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director makes a preliminary investigation of the allegations of the petition and
recommends to the Board whether a proceeding should be instituted. If the Board
believes that a proceeding is called for it directs the regional director to conduct a
formal investigation and provide for a hearing. In these proceedings the Board's
counsel does not act as prosecutor, merely introducing evidence to sustain the jurisdiction of the Board. The facts on the issue of representation must be developed by
the rival claimants. The substantive problems raised under this section and the procedure adopted for the determination of representatives by election or otherwise are
discussed in Professor Rice's article on "The Determination of Employee Representatives."
V
In its first two Annual Reports, the Board has presented detailed analyses of the
business coming before it. These reports are supplemented by a monthly press release, showing the cases handled the preceding month and cumulating the figures
for the entire period of the Board's activity. From a release of March i, 1938, carrying the totals forward to February i, 1938 from the Fall of 1935 when the Board

began activity (a 28 months' period) the following data are taken:
No. of Cases

Cases received ........................................
:11,861
Cases closed ......................
.... *-..
8,614
By agreemnt of both parties .........................
4,833
By dismissal ......................................
1,305
By withdrawal ....................................
2,032
By order to cease and desist, compliance before order,
certifications or refusal to certify, transfer to other
agencies, etc ....................................
444
Cases pending ........................................
3,247

Workers Involved

3,133,322
1,770,709

io89,o98
i65,o8i
393,526

123,004

1,352,513

Of the cases handled, 1,372 were strike cases involving 244,275 workers, and, of
these, io6o were settled. 173,3o8 workers were reinstated after strikes and lock-outs.
The Board's action averted 505 threatened strikes, involving 127,286 workers. 8,342
workers were reinstated after discriminatory discharge. i,ooo elections by secret
ballot were held under Board supervision in which 36o,228 valid ballots were cast.
All but 88 of these elections were conducted in the io months' period following the
validation of the Act by the Supreme Court on April 12, 1937. A total of 3,684 election petitions, joined in by 1,364,7oI workers, have been received by the Board.
The unfair labor practices enumerated in Section 8 which have afforded the most
grist for the Board's mill have been the third (discrimination against employees
for union activity) producing 3,799 cases, and the fifth (refusal to bargain collectively) producing 2,683 cases. In all cases involving .unfair labor practices, the
Board includes in its complaint a charge of violation of the catch-all prohibition
contained in Section 8(i), but in relatively few cases is this the sole allegation.
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The rate of new business, though diminishing, remains high. The cases received
during the last four months for which releases have been obtained number as follows: October, i,o63; November, 915; December, 684; January, 682.
VI

The articles devoted to problems arising in the interpretation and application of
the Act are concerned only to a limited degree with the antecedent questions of the
constitutional scope and bases of the powers it confers. The Supreme Court decisions

relating to these questions have already been accorded such exhaustive consideration
in legal periodical literature that only the brief treatment which follows has been
provided in this symposium, since a detailed study would have been possible only
at the sacrifice of matter which has not been accorded such thorough discussion
elsewhere.
At the inception of the Board's activities it was met with a barrage of suits in the
federal district courts to restrain proceedings under the Act. Most of these suits were
dismissed by the district courts, and those injunctions which were granted were reversed by all except the Circuit Court of Appeals for the First Circuit. The question
of the power to 'enjoin the conduct of Board proceedings, was finally determined in
Mye s v. Bethlehem Shipbuilding Corp., Ltd.,8 holding constitutional the statutory
grant of exclusive jurisdiction to the Board, subject only to judicial review after the
administrative procedure had been followed.
Before this decision was reached, however, five cases9 had been decided by the
Supreme Court (dividing five to four in all but one case') upholding the.validity of
the Board's orders. The three chief lines of attack on their constitutionality were the
following:" (i) that the Act's substantive requirements deprive the employer of
liberty of contract without due process of law in violation of the Fifth Amendment;
(2) that its procedural provisions are also violative of that amendment; and (3)that
the application of the Act to manufacturing industries is unwarranted by the commerce clause which affords the constitutional basis for the Act.
The contention that the employer was arbitrarily deprived of liberty of contract
was answered by the assertion of the right of employees to organize for the redress
of grievances and the promotion of labor agreements and the conclusion that "re858 Sup. Ct. 459, decided Jan. 31, 1938, by a unanimous court.
9
NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U. S. 1 (1937); NLRB v. Fruehauf Trailer Co., id.49;
NLRB v. Friedman-Harry Marks Clothing Co., id.58 (to which is appended the dissent from the decision in all three cases); Associated Press v. NLRB, id.1o3; Washington, Virginia & Maryland Coach Co.
v. NLRB, id.142.
'The decision in the Coach Co. case, supranote 9, was unanimous. Not only was there no substantial
commerce issue raised in this case, but the justices dissenting in the other cases seemed content to permit

restraints on the liberty of contract of public carriers which they deemed improper in the case of private
industry, although in their Olissent on this point, 301 U. S. at 10-103, they relied on Adair v. U. S., 208
U. S. 161 (i9o8) (federal act penalizing discharge by interstate carrier for union membership invalid).
'In Associated Press v. NLRB, supra note 9,it was urged that the application of the Act operated to
abridge the freedom of the press guaranteed by the First Amendment. The decision that it did not evoke
a vehement dissent. The Board's order in NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., supra note 9, that
employees be reinstated with back pay was attacked as a deprivation of the right to trial by jury
guaranteed by the Seventh Amendment. This contention was dismissed on .the ground that the Amendment applied only to actions at common law and not to statutory causes.
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straint for the purpose of preventing an unjust interference with that right cannot
be considered arbitrary or capricious.' 2 It was pointed out that the Act does not
compel agreements between employers and employees' 3 nor "interfere with the
normal right of the employer to select its employees or to discharge them," limiting
only the power of the employer to intimidate or coerce its employees "under cover
of that right."'14 The contention that the Act is one-sided was dismissed on the
5
ground that it related not to Congressional power but to Congressional policy.'
The attack on procedural provisions of the Act was accorded scant attention.
They were found not "to offend constitutional requirements governing the creation
and action of administrative bodies"' 6 and to provide adequate opportunity to secure
judicial protection against arbitrary action in accordance with well-settled rules
17
applicable to administrative agencies.'
By far the most difficult problem posed by the Act was -he extent of the Board's
jurisdiction under the statutory grant of power to prevent unfair labor practices
"affecting commerce." Section i, in describing the evils which the Act was designed
to combat, sought to establish, by its emphasis upon obstructions to the "flow" of
materials "from" and "into" the channels of interstate and foreign commerce, that
protection to such commerce required the curbing of industrial strife in industries
receiving and supplying those materials. Obviously the work of the Board would
have been of little significance had its jurisdiction been strictly confined to disputes
occurring among workers themselves engaged in commerce, especially in view of the
already-existing Railway Labor Board. However, to extend the Board's jurisdiction
beyond this limited group required acceptance by the Supreme Court of the proposition that labor disputes in manufacturing industries bore so direct a relation to
interstate commerce as to justify the application of this measure to prevent them.
Precedent, as usual, was Janus-faced. Favorable to the Board's contention were
such decisions as the Coronado Coal Co. cases,' 8 applying the Sherman Act to labor
union activities in the coal mining industry; Stafford v. Wallace,"9 sustaining the
Packers and Stockyards Act; Chicago Board of Trade v. Olsen,20 sustaining the
Grain Futures Act; and the The Shreveport Case,"' validating federal regulation of
intrastate raliroad rates found to affect-interstate rates. Opposed to the Board's contention were the oft-distinguished Knight Co. 22 case, denying the applicability of the
Sherman Act to manufacturing industries; the Schechter case,23 holding NRA
regulation of trade practices in the New York poultry trade beyond the scope of the
commerce power; and especially the formidable Carter Coal Co.24 case, reaching a
like result as to regulation of hours and wages under the Bituminous Coal Conservation Act of 1935.
NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 30 U. S. at 44.
"Id. at 45.
"Id. at 45-46.
"Id. at 46.
"Ibid.
'Id. at 47.
"United Mine Workers v. Coronado Coal Co., 259 U. S. 344 (1922); Coronado Coal Co. v. United
Mine Workers, 268 U. S. 295 (1925).
"D258 U. S. 495 (1922).
0262 U. S. x (1923).
2234 U. S. 342 (1914).
"U. S. v. E. C. Knight Co., 156 U. S. i (x895). 'Schechter Corp. v. U. S., 295 U. S.495 (1935).
"Carter v. Carter Coal Co., 298 U. S. 238 (1936).
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Of the five NLRB cases first reaching the Supreme Court, two presented no real
problem under the commerce clause,* since one involved the Associated Press, engaged in the business of interstate communication, and the other an interstate bus
line. Of the other three cases, one involved the Jones & Laughlin Steel Corporation,
a large and vertically integrated steel producer, employing over half a million men,
including io,ooo in the plant where the dispute arose; a second involved the Fruehauf
Trailer Co., the largest trailer manufacturer in the United States, which sold over
8o% of its products outside the state of manufacture; and the third, the FriedmanHarry Marks Clothing Co., a men's clothing manufacturer employing 8oo men and
doing a $2,000,000 business, obtaining most of its materials and shipping most of its
products interstate.
The divergence of opinion in the Court was sharpest on the commerce clause
issue. The majority view was developed in the Jones & Laughlin case, the other
cases being decided on its authority without discussion beyond a recital of the findings of the Board. The Court, in an opinion by the Chief Justice, refused to confine
Congressional power to those "transactions which can be deemed to be an essential
part of a 'flow' of interstate and foreign commerce" 25 and thus liberated the problem
from the restrictions which too literal adherence to that metaphor would have imposed. Instead, it stated the test to be whether activities, though "intrastate in character when separately considered," had "such close and substantial relations to
interstate commerce that their control is essential or appropriate to protect that commerce from burdens or obstructions."2 6 Turning to the facts of the case under consideration, it found that the stoppage of the Steel Corporation's "manufacturing
operations by industrial strife would have a most serious effect upon interstate commerce. In view of respondent's far-flung activities it is idle to say that the effect
would be indirect or remote. It is obvious that the effect would be immediate and
27
might be catastrophic."
The dissenters, selecting the Clothing Co. case, on which to base their argument,
observed the inconsequential place of the company in its industry and the extended
chain of events necessary before the dispute in which the Board was called to intervene would affect the volume of goods moving in interstate commerce, and concluded by asserting that "a more remote and indirect interference with, interstate
commerce or a more definite invasion of the powers reserved to the states is difficult,
if not impossible, to imagine."2 8
How "close and substantial" must be the effect upon interstate commerce of a
particular action to bring it within the scope of federal power is left by the Court to
be- determined as the individual case arises. But as the Board, in its Second Annual
Report, pointed out, "it is clear from these decisions that neither size, interstate ramifications, relative portion in the industry, character of commodity produced, nor
2
number of men.employed, is a controlling factor."
NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U. S. at 36.
Mid. at 37.
'ld. at 41.
NLRB v. Friedman-Harry Marks Clothing Co., 301 U. S. at 97.
NLRB, SECOND ANNUAL REPORT (1937) 56.
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Since this statement, another Supreme Court decision has dealt with the jurisdictional problem: Santa Cruz FruitPacking Co. v. National Labor Relations Board,"0
decided March 28, 1938. The Packing Co. was ordered by the Board to cease and
desist from certain unfair labor practices and to reinstate certain discharged employees with back pay. The Board secured an affirmance of its order by the Circuit
Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, one judge dissenting, and this judgment
was affirmed in turn by the Supreme Court. The bulk of the company's "pack" was
comprised of products grown in California and only 37o was shipped in interstate
and foreign commerce. The Court held without merit, "in view of the interstate commerce actually carried on by petitioner," a distinction based on the fact that here
there was no continuous flow of interstate commerce through the state. The Court
insisted that it had not abandoned the requirement that a "direct and substantial
relation to interstate commerce" be shown "to justify federal intervention for its
protection" but stated that "the criterion is necessarily one of degree and must be so
defined" even though "this does not satisfy those who seek for mathematical or
rigid formulas." It found justification for its decision in the immediate disruption
of interstate trade resulting from the strike called upon the discharge of petitioner's
employees for union activities.
Justices Butler and McReynolds, the remaining two of the four dissenters in the
earlier cases, dissented once more in an opinion by the former, plaintively-and
vainly-calling upon the majority for a "statement as to whether it meant to overrule
the Carter case."
The decisions of the Supreme Court on the jurisdictional issue have provided the
Board sea-room aplenty, though they afforded no fixed points for it to steer by. For
its hearings, the Board has been careful to provide substantial evidence as to the
character of the business done by the respondents, being aided in this task by the
work of its Division of Economic Research which prepares evidence indicating jurisdiction in border-line cases. 31 Few cases in which the Board has asserted jurisdiction
seem more vulnerable to attack on jurisdictional grounds than the Santa Cruz case.
Yet the fact that the Board in that and comparable cases has intervened in the affairs
of industries handling a large volume of intrastate business promises to give rise to
a serious jurisdictional problem as the number of states adopting acts similar to the
Wagner Act increases. 32 There is now pending before the Wisconsin Supreme
Court a case in which the jurisdiction of the Wisconsin Labor Relations Board has
been questioned as to an industry doing both intra- and interstate business.83 Whatever the result of that case, administrative cooperation between the national and
state boards would seem essential to the efficient functioning of a .comprehensive
system of regulation.
D. F. C.
5 1Reported

in 2 LABOR REL. REP., April 4, 1938, p. 156.
For a description of the functions of this division, see NLRB, SacoND ANN UAL REPORT (1937) 41-47.
: Such acts have been passed in Utah, Wisconsin, New York, Massachusetts and Pennsylvania.
'Wis. LRB v. Fred Rueping Leather Co. The decision of the lower court upholding jurisdiction is
reported in i LABOR REL. REP. 322 (1937).

